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CITY OF EDMONDS v. OXFORD HOUSE, 
INC.: OPENING DOORS TO HOUSING FOR 
HANDICAPPED PERSONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,l the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Fair Housing Act's (here-
inafter the "FHA") broad exemption for local maximum occu-
pancy restrictions did not apply to the City's single family 
zoning restrictions.2 Although the City's ordinance did not 
qualify for exemption from the FHA, the Supreme Court held 
that the District Court would have to consider whether the 
City discriminated against Oxford House residents.3 Specifical-
1. _ u.s. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (per Ginsburg, J., Thomas, J. dis-
senting). Oxford House opened a home for 10 to 12 unrelated recovering drug 
addicts and alcoholics in a single-family residence. The City enforced its zoning 
code which prohibits more than 5 unrelated persons from living together in a 
single-family residence. Oxford House requested that the City make a reasonable 
accommodation pursuant to the FHA. The City refused and sued Oxford House 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the zoning ordinance qualified for exemption 
from the FHA as a "local . . . restriction regarding the maximum number of occu-
pants permitted to occupy a dwelling." [d. at 1778-1779. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). Congress originally enacted the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion or national origin in housing. The FHA was later expanded to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex (1974), see Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 808(B), 88 Stat 729) and on 
the basis of handicap and familial status (1988), see id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602 
(h), (k». In fmding that the ordinance did not qualify for exemption from the 
FHA, the Court held that a city cannot pass an ordinance which restricts maxi-
mum occupancy on any basis other than person per square foot or per bedroom. 
[d. at 1782-83. 
3. [d. at 1779, 1783. 
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1
Todus: Fair Housing Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
738 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:737 
ly, the Court remanded to the District Court for further consid-
eration of the claims by Oxford House that the City must make 
a "reasonable accommodation."4 
The Edmonds decision is important for two reasons. First 
it will help handicapped persons attain greater access to hous-
ing.5 Specifically, the decision marks the first time the Court 
has struck down a local zoning ordinance because it failed to 
qualify for the broad exemption from the FHA's anti-discrimi-
nation provisions for local ordinances.6 Although it took seven 
years for a case to reach the Court which allowed it to enforce 
the legislative intent, the Edmonds decision provides a clear 
message that the Court plans to follow the Congressional in-
tene to pronounce a national commitment to prohibit exclu-
sions of handicapped persons from the American mainstream 
on the basis of stereotypes and ignorance.8 
Second, the Edmonds decision will significantly affect how 
future zoning ordinances are drafted because the Court 
approved density guidelines and not family composition rules.9 
For although handicapped persons may not fall within the 
traditional concept of family, they nevertheless deserve a fami-
4. [d. at 1783. 
5. See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
the effect on access to housing and curbing discrimination. 
6. See Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 376 (1992) (Athens' ordinance, permitting a maximum of four unrelated 
persons to live together in a single residence, qualified for exemption from the 
FHA for "local maximum occupancy restrictions"). 
7. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-1782 (decided in 1995). Congress enacted the 
FHA amendments prohibiting discrimination against handicapped persons and 
defining discrimination to include "a refusal to make [a] reasonable accommoda-
tion" in 1988. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(h), 3604(O(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
8. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82 n.8. "The Fair Housing Act Amendments 
Act . . . is a clear pronouncement to end the unnecessary exclusion of person with 
handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and 
ignorances, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individu-
als." House Report at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (1988) (herein-
after "House Report"). See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the legislative intent behind the FHA. 
9. Here the author is using "density" to refer to restrictions based on the 
number of people allowed by floor area or by space, like per square foot or per 
bedroom for example. In contrast, "maximum occupancy" refers to maximum caps 
placed on the total number of persons permitted per dwelling; an ordinance plac-
ing a maximum of five persons per house is an example. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 
1781-82 n.B. 
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ly-like environment. Therefore, Edmonds will discourage strict 
application of existing ordinances that adversely impact the 
rights of handicapped persons.10 
Specifically, the Court's remand permits the District Court 
to explore whether a "reasonable accommodation," as provided 
for in the FHA, is appropriate since the parties did not litigate 
the issue in the lower courts. 11 That decision may extend pro-
tection under the FHA to other Oxford House residents and 
others similarly situated throughout the country. After the 
District Court's decision on remand, groups similar to the Ox-
ford House may reap the benefits of the Court's "reasonable 
accommodations" interpretation. 12 
This note will begin with an examination of the Edmond 
Court's reasoning, and follow with a brief discussion of Oxford 
House and the FHA. Next, the important role Oxford House 
has played in challenging discriminatory housing practices will 
be summarized. This note will then examine the Congressional 
intent behind the FHA, concluding with a brief exploration of 
the national impact this decision may have on handicapped 
persons and local ordinances. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The rights of handicapped persons are protected through 
various means. Two main protectors of those rights are Oxford 
House, a private organization, and the FHA, legislation enact-
ed by Congress. 
A. OXFORD HOUSE: THE NATIONAL MODEL FOR DRUG AND 
ALCOHOL ADDICT RECOVERY PROGRAMS CHALLENGES 
DISCRIMINATORY CITY ORDNANCES 
Oxford House, a private organization, has been at the 
10. See infra note 195 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
decision's effect on application of ordinances to handicapped persons. 
11. Edmonds, 115 s. Ct. at 1783. 
12. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
the "reasonable accommodations" issue. 
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forefront of the struggle to establish the housing rights of 
handicapped persons.13 Oxford House began challenging dis-
criminatory city ordinances shortly after Congress extended 
protection to handicapped persons in 1988.14 In 1990, Oxford 
House was involved in its first litigation, challenging a city 
ordinance which they claimed violated the Fair Housing Act. 15 
1. What is an "Oxford House?" 
Oxford House is a not-for-profit organization serving as 
the umbrella organization for a national network of approxi-
mately four hundred individual Oxford Houses. 16 Oxford 
House Inc. was formed in 1975 in the Washington, D.C. area 
by a former Capitol Hill lawyer and recovering alcoholic. 17 
13. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text providing examples of Ox-
ford House challenging ordinances as violations of the FHA. 
14. The first reported case was Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 
769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991). The FHA was amended in 1988 to extend cover-
age to handicapped persons. See infra notes 52-82 and accompanying text for a 
full discussion of the amendments. 
15. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 
1991). On June 6, 1990, the City of Plainfield, New Jersey filed a "Complaint and 
Order to Show Cause" in Superior Court. This marked the first time Oxford House 
was sued after Congress enacted the 1988 amendments to the FHA. Id. at 1333. 
A recent on-line search revealed eight cases reported in federal courts-see 
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995); Oxford House Inc. 
v. City of Albany, 155 F.R.D. 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Oxford House-C v. City of St. 
Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D.Mo. 1994); Oxford House Inc. v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D.Va 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 
819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. 
Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. 
Supp. 450, (D. N.J. 1992); U.S. v. Borough of Audubon, N.J., 797 F. Supp. 353 
(D.N.J. 1991); and Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 
(D.N.J. 1991). Two state court cases have been reported-see Cherry Hill Tp. v. 
Oxford House, Inc. 263 N.J. Super. 25 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1993) (this case is sepa-
rate from the reported federal case in n.35 infra) and Colony Park Apartments v. 
Public Service Com'n, 155 Mich. App. 134, (Mich. App. 1985). 
See also Janan Hanna, Palatine Thwarted in Group-Home Case, November 
10, 1993, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 10, 1993, at 1 (stating thirteen cases have been filed by 
the Justice Department on behalf of Oxford House; general counsel for Oxford 
House claiming Oxford House prevailed on all but two). 
In these suits, Oxford House challenged city ordinances and/or the appli-
cation of city ordinances. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. 
Ct. 1776 (1995). 
16. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452. This number was cited in 1992 and a 
later Oxford House case indicated that there are more than 450 Oxford Houses in 
City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1563. 
17. Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program Ex-
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Oxford House establishes group homes for recovering alcoholics 
and other substance abusers. 18 
Oxford House establishes group homes in "clean, drug~free, 
single family neighborhoods that will provide the occupants 
with a sense of pride and self worth.,,19 It prefers to locate 
homes in larger single family houses because they provide the 
desired family atmosphere.20 The location of the houses in 
single~family residential neighborhoods has proven crucial to 
"an individual's recovery by promoting self~esteem, creating an 
incentive not to relapse and avoiding the temptations that the 
presence of drug~trafficking can create."21 Access to public 
transportation is important because most residents do not own 
cars.22 In addition, access to Alcoholics Anonymous and Nar~ 
cotics Anonymous meetings is important to residents in recov~ 
ery.23 Generally, eight to fifteen residents reside in Oxford 
Homes. This range represents the number of residents which 
make the homes economically and therapeutically viable.24 
Oxford Houses do not provide drug rehabilitation pro~ 
grams or treatment, health care, or social services.25 Before 
entering an Oxford House, persons must complete residential 
drug treatment programs.26 Each resident is required to work 
and contribute to the democratic running of the house.27 The 
three requirements of an Oxford Home are: (1) democratic self~ 
government in which the residents make all decisions to run 
the house; (2) economic self~sufficiency in that the residents 
must support themselves without government assistance; and 
empted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at C3. 
18. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452. 
19. Id. at 453. 
20. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564. 
21. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 453 (emphasis added). 
22. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564. 
23.Id. 
24. Id. at 1571. However, in City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1255 n.1, 
the court discussed that the main obstacle to that Oxford House was financial, but 
treated the complaint in the light most favorable to Oxford House because the 
City of Virginia Beach had filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore the court found 
that the complaint alleged that therapeutic value suffered when the number of 
residents was restricted to four. Id. 
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(3) zero drug tolerance.28 A resident who uses drugs or alco-
hol, even once, is automatically expelled from the house.29 
2. Oxford House: Congressional Model for Drug and Alcohol 
Abuse Programs 
Congress formally recognized the Oxford House model in 
1988 when President Reagan signed legislation to nationally 
expand use of the Oxford House mode1.30 Under this legisla-
tion, states receiving at least $100,000 from federal block grant 
funds for alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and mental health servic-
es must make loans available to recovering alcoholics and 
drugs addicts wishing to live in a group home based on the 
Oxford House model. 31 In many states Oxford House main-
tains a contractual relationship with state health departments 
to provide "revolving" loan funds. 32 
B. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
While Oxford House has led the legal challenge to housing 
discrimination, Congress has also been a key player in enact-
ing anti-discrimination legislation for handicapped persons.33 
Initially, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act in 1968 to 
prohibit discrimination in housing.34 Twenty years later, Con-
28. 1d. 
29. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 452. Accord City of St. Louis, 
843 F. Supp. at 1562. 
30. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1562 (citing Public Law No. 100-690, 
102 State. 4181 (November 18, 1988». 
31. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1561. In 1994 in Missouri, six residents 
were required to qualify for a start-up loan for costs up to $4000. The interest-free 
loans must be repaid within two years. 1d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25). In 1992 in 
New Jersey, only four residents were required to qualify for loans. Township of 
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 453. 
32. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1562-63. "Revolving" loans are loans 
given to help establish group homes for recovering addicts. A group of four or 
more is entitled to up to $4000 for start-up costs such as a security deposit and 
the first month's rent. The loan must be repaid within two years. To be eligible, 
the group must operate under the Oxford House model. Township of Cherry Hill, 
799 F. Supp. at 453. 
33. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
Congress' anti-discrimination legislation. 
34. See House Report, supra note 7, at 15. In 1968, Congress determined that 
racial discrimination limited access to housing for racial minorities. 1d. In re-
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gress amended the FHA to extend protection to handicapped 
persons.35 At that time, Congress also exempted local maxi-
mum occupancy restrictions from the FHA's anti-discrimina-
tion protection.36 
1. "Handicapped" Persons Receive Protection Under the 
FHA37 
The 1988 amendments to the FHA extended protection to 
"handicapped" persons.3S The amendments did not specifically 
list covered disabilities.39 Therefore, courts must look to the 
legislative history behind the amendments to discern what 
Congress meant by "handicapped." This legislative record 
shows, first, that Congress sought to protect a broad class of 
handicapped persons40 and, secondly, to proffer a public policy 
sponse, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act as Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 to prohibit the invidious racial discrimination which prevailed 
throughout the country. [d. Congress found that since discrimination in housing 
affected interstate commerce, it had the power under the Commerce Clause to 
enact prohibitive legislation. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1573 (discussing 
Congressional power under the commerce clause to regulate interstate activities). 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited only racial discrimination in housing, 
including the rental and sale of homes. Fair Housing Act § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied as amended 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988». According to the House report on the 
1988 amendments, the Fair Housing Act was enacted in reaction to the urban 
unrest of the mid 1960s and the assassination of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. House Report, supra note 7, at 15. 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
37. The FHA states: 
"Handicap means, with respect to a person - (1) a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 
one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a 
record of having such an impairment, or (3) being 
regarded as having such an impairment, but such term 
does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802»." 
See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995), House Report, supra note 7, at 
17-8. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). The amendments apply a broad 
definition because of the difficulty in creating a comprehensive list and because 
not all conditions existed or were common such that they should be protected. See 
House Report, supra note 7, at 22 n.55. 
40. House Report, supra note 7, at 18. 
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against discrimination in housing that had the effect of exclud-
ing handicapped persons from everyday life. 41 
Although Congress did not list specific disabilities under 
its definition of "handicapped,"42 the House Report discloses 
that Congress did intend the FHA protections to apply to per-
sons with a record of drug use or addiction,43 except current 
users of illegal drugs, as long as they otherwise qualified as 
"handicapped" by their actual impairment or by the perception 
of their impairment.44 Specifically, Congress did not intend to 
exclude persons who have recovered from an addiction or are 
participating in a treatment program or self-help groUp.45 The 
House Report also stated that as with other disabled persons 
(cancer or tuberculosis patients), former drug-dependent per-
sons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants sim-
ply on the basis of status.46 
Besides defining "handicapped," the legislative history 
more importantly discloses the Congressional desire to curb 
housing discrimination and extinguish public attitudes fueling 
that discrimination.47 Congress intended the 1988 Amend-
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 22. This specific group of persons is mentioned because it is the 
handicap the group of residents living in the Edmonds Oxford House shared. 
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. 
44. House Report, supra note 7, at 22. Indeed, parties to FHA litigation usual-
ly agree that recovering drug addicts and alcoholics qualify for protection under 
the FHA as "handicapped" persons. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Cf Township of 
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 459-460 (where the court required proof not only of 
the residents' status as alcoholics or drug addicts, but also preliminary proof that 
their addiction impacted a major life function) and Borough of Audubon, 797 F. 
Supp. at 358 (where the City agreed that the residents were alcoholics and ad-
dicts, but challenged the fact that they were substantially limited in their major 
life activities). An individual perceived as being a drug user is covered under the 
Amendments if he can demonstrate that he is seen as having an impairment and 
that he is not currently using illegal drugs. House Report, supra note 7, at 22. 
45. [d. The Report stated that depriving those persons of housing "would con-
stitute irrational discrimination that may seriously jeopardize their continued re-
covery." [d. Although the report does not refer to any specific instances or proof of 
such a statement, the author believes the phrase "jeopardizing recovery" foreshad-
ows case law in which the Courts of Appeal cite Oxford House assertions about 
the therapeutic viability of its group homes. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach, 825 
F. Supp. at 1255 n.l and City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564 n.2. 
46. House Report, supra note 7, at 22. 
47. [d. at 18. 
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ments to clearly pronounce a national commitment to end 
exclusion of handicapped persons from mainstream life.48 In 
addition, the House Report shows that Congress condemned 
"unfounded speculations" and "[g]eneralized perceptions about 
disabilities.,,49 Although the House Report stated that discrim-
ination against handicapped persons based on prejudice and 
stereotyping were clearly prohibited, this strong anti-discrimi-
nation policy was absent from the text of the 1988 amend-
ments.50 
The House Report also indicates Congress' belief that 
prohibiting discrimination would alter the stereotypes that 
have excluded handicapped persons from everyday life.51 Fur-
thermore, the Report demonstrates that Congress appreciated 
that handicapped persons have been denied housing because of 
misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice.52 Finally, 
the House Report states that Congress intended the amend-
ments to reach two situations in which handicapped persons 
experienced discrimination, namely denying services to handi-
capped persons on the basis of status and excluding congregate 
living arrangements of persons with handicaps.53 
48. [d. 
49. [d. The report mentioned several examples of handicapped persons who 
had been discriminated against in housing and deplored such discrimination. 
Wheelchair users, visually and hearing impaired persons, mentally retarded per-
sons, and people with AIDS or who test positive for the AIDS virus were cited as 
actual groups who had been discriminated against in housing because of prejudice 
and aversion. [d. 
50. House Report, supra note 7, at 18; see generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3607. 
51. House Report, supra note 7, at 18. 
52. [d. Specifically, handicapped persons have been denied housing "because 
they make non-handicapped people uncomfortable." [d. 
53. [d. at 23. It appears the Supreme Court uses the language from the House 
Report to find the Edmonds ordinance does not qualify for exemption from the 
FHA as a "reasonable local ordinance." However, the remainder of the report dis-
cussing this subsection seems to limit it to facilities and services other than basic 
housing, like parking, cleaning services and other benefits made available to the 
non-handicapped tenants, residents, and owners. [d. at 23-24. 
9
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2. Local Maximum Occupancy Restrictions are Exempt from 
FHA54 
As well as extending the FHA to handicapped persons, 
Congress has exempted reasonable local density ordinances 
from the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHA. 55 Again, 
the legislative history found in the House Report defines what 
Congress intended to exempt from the FHA. 56 Although the 
report indicates that Congress recognized that local govern-
ments have the authority to protect safety and health and to 
regulate land use, this authority has sometimes been used to 
restrict the rights of individuals with handicaps to live in cer-
tain communities. 57 Further, the House Report explains that 
Congress intended this exemption to apply to limits placed on 
"the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum num-
ber of square feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of the 
unit.,,58 Such restrictions may of course continue provided 
they apply to all occupants, and do not "discriminate on the 
basis of ... handicap.,,59 
Congress, however, clearly intended to prohibit from ex-
emption local ordinances that amounted to "health, safety or 
land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements" of 
unrelated persons with disabilities.60 Since these require-
ments are not placed on traditional families or other groups of 
unrelated people, Congress recognized that these requirements 
may discriminate against persons with disabilities.61 Further, 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). "Nothing in this title limits 
the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding 
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." Id. 
55.Id. 
56. See House Report, supra note 7, at 23-24, 31. 
57. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985». There, the Supreme Court overturned the 
City's requirement that a group home for mentally retarded persons secure a spe-
cial use permit. Id. 
58. House Report, supra note 7, at 31. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 24. "This has been accomplished by such means as the enactment or 
imposition of health, safety or land-use requirements on congregate living arrange-
ments among non-related persons with disabilities. Since these requirements are 
not imposed on families and groups of similar size of other unrelated people, these 
requirements have the effect of discriminating against person with disabilities." Id. 
61. Id. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/9
1996] FAIR HOUSING ACT 747 
the House Report details Congress' intent to prohibit discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons in zoning decisions and 
practices, land-use regulations, covenants, and permit proce-
dures that effectively prevent handicapped individuals from 
living in a selected residence in the community.62 Congress 
stated that even the application of otherwise neutral rules 
which had the effect of discriminating against handicapped 
persons would amount to discrimination prohibited by the 
FHA. 53 
The House Report provides valuable insight into Congress' 
intent behind the 1988 amendments that extended protection 
to handicapped persons.64 It states that exclusion of handi-
capped persons through invidious discrimination and procedur-
al hurdles would not be tolerated.65 In addition, Congress nar-
rowly defined the new exemption from the FHA for local maxi-
mum occupancy restrictions.66 Congress balanced local 
government's interest in regulating land use with the desire to 
prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons. 
C. OXFORD HOUSE CASES: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE 
FHA AND OXFORD HOUSE 
The FHA anti-discrimination protection covers handi-
capped persons, including former alcoholics and drug ad-
dicts.67 Even so, Oxford House and other group home advo-
cates· have faced major obstacles in protecting their clients 
62. House Report, supra note 7, at 24. 
63. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 435 (1985)). In Cleburne the city's 
stated reasons were a 500 year flood plain, the location of the house across the 
street from a school which would result in taunting of the house's residents, and 
fear of lowered property values. Again the Court rejected all of these stated rea-
sons as based on irrational fears. Id. "Such discrimination often results from false 
or over-protective assumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as 
unfounded fears of difficulties about the problems that their tenancies may pose." 
House Report, supra note 7, at 24. 
64. See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
legislative intent behind the FHA. 
65. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that, for example, special use 
permits would not be tolerated). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995); House Report, supra note 7, at 
23-24, 3l. 
67. House Report, supra note 7, at 22. 
11
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against housing discrimination.68 Complex procedures and 
invidious discrimination have decreased the effectiveness of 
such programs and legislation.69 In several cities, ordinances 
have required group homes to apply for a variance or a condi-
tional use permit.70 In other cities, residents have faced invid-
ious discrimination by city officials. 71 
City ordinances often require a variance and/or a public 
hearing in order to permit the group home to operate in a 
single-family district.72 In United States v. Borough of 
Audubon,73 the City of Audubon required the property owners 
of an Oxford House to either request a variance to use the 
home as a boarding house or evict the Oxford House resi-
dents.74 In Oxford House v. City of St. Louis, a group home of 
nine or more could operate in a single-family district only if it 
obtained a variance.75 In Oxford House v. Township of Cherry 
68. Witness all the suits filed by or on behalf of Oxford House since 1988, see 
supra note 15 for a list of suits involving Oxford Houses since 1988 and see infra 
notes 71-74, 107-108 discussing specific cases of invidious discrimination and spe-
cial procedures. 
69. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text for examples of zoning re-
quirements placed on group homes. 
70. See Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353. 
71. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1566-67. The City Zoning Administrator 
of the City of St. Louis testified "that he 'wouldn't want them living next door to 
him.' His fears "included common, stereotypical fears such as safety, transiency, 
and a negative effect on property values." Authors comment: while this discrimina-
tion would be less offensive and actionable if it came from a neighbor of the 
house, it is much more offensive coming from a city official. ld. 
72. ld. at 1568. The City of St. Louis requested Oxford House to apply for a 
variance under the City's zoning ordinances. "Oxford House took the position that 
it should not be required to participate in variance or conditional use applica-
tions." ld. 
On the other hand, the Township of Cherry Hill required applicants who 
did not meet the ordinance's definition of "family" to apply for a variance. The 
variance involved public hearings, "at which the group members must present 
testimony establishing they meet the vague standard of [the ordinance]." Township 
of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455. 
73. 797 F. Supp. at 356. 
74. [d. The house, a three-story, six-bedroom structure, was located in an area 
zoned for single-family residences. Prior to its use as an Oxford House, Audubon 
issued a resolution permitting the residence to be used as a duplex and this use 
had never been objected to by neighbors or the City. ld. at 355. The property 
owners did not request a variance and did not evict the residents. Audubon issued 
weekly citations to the owners whose prosecution was stayed pending the outcome 
of the federal court case. ld. at 356-57. 
75. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568-69. However, a variance for a 
group home of more than eight people was impossible to acquire. The zoning 
12
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Hill,76 the township presented a similar requirement that the 
property owners request a variance from the ordinance.77 Un-
like other city ordinances that numerically restrict unrelated 
persons, Cherry Hill's ordinance imposed a "permanency and 
stability" standard on groups of unrelated persons which was 
not imposed on persons related by blood or marriage.78 In or-
der to obtain a variance, the residents had to testify at a public 
hearing that they met this undefined standard.79 The Town-
ship ruled that Oxford House could not operate in any of the 
five residential zones.80 Therefore, the Township effectively 
prohibited Oxford House from operating a group home in any 
single-family residential district and thereby discriminated 
against the residents as handicapped persons.81 
Procedural requirements such as conditional or special use 
permits imposed on group homes also discriminate against 
handicapped persons.82 In Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 
the City required a conditional use permit for the Oxford 
House to operate in a multi-family district.s3 And in Oxford 
scheme provided that the City should not grant variances for "uses" that are not 
allowed by right or conditionally. Since a group home was not allowed either con-
ditionally or by right in a single family district, a variance would be impossible to 
obtain. Clearly, the Oxford Houses, even though they never applied for a variance, 
would have been denied a variance by the City. 1d. at 1568-70. 
76. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455. 
77. 1d. 
78. 1d. In addition, the "standard is never imposed on groups related by blood 
or marriage because they are automatically found to meet the definition of 'family' 
regardless of their particular circumstances." 1d. In n.7 the court made specific 
findings in which the Director of Community Development admitted he could not 
think of a single incident in which a group of related people were denied a cer-
tificate on the basis of their failure to meet the definition of family or the "perma-
nency or stability" standard. 1d. 
79. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 455. 
80. 1d. at 456. 
8l. See id. 
82. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text for examples of discrim-
inatory procedural requirements. 
83. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568. The City ordinance permitted a 
group home of nine or more residents as a matter of right only in the central 
business district and a memorial district. 1d. The court found the ordinance did 
not qualify as an exemption from the FHA because "it simply restricts the maxi-
mum number of certain types of occupants." 1d. at 1574. The court noted the de-
cision in Elliott, 960 F.2d 975, but found its reasoning unpersuasive. City of St. 
Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1574. The court found the City violated the FHA, granted 
the permanent injunction, and awarded attorneys' fees. 1d. at 1584. 
13
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House v. City of Virginia Beach, a city ordinance required Ox-
ford House to apply for a conditional use permit for a group 
home of more than four unrelated individuals in a single-fami-
ly district.B4 Although Oxford House argued in City of St. Lou-
is and City of Virginia Beach that requiring a conditional use 
permit and the resulting public hearing violated the FHA (be-
cause other groups of unrelated persons were not subjected to 
this procedure), the courts required Oxford House to follow the 
application procedure and subject the residents to a public 
hearing.85 In several cases in which residents faced invidious 
discrimination by city officials,86 this discrimination was 
found to violate the FHA.87 In Oxford House-C v. City of St. 
Louis, the court expressed that it was not surprised to find 
discrimination by officials "given ... that none of the City 
housing inspectors or building or zoning officials . . . have ever 
received any training regarding discrimination in housing prac-
tices."88 The zoning administrator testified that he "wouldn't 
want them living next door to him.,,89 
The background behind the recent Edmonds decision in-
volves understanding the Oxford House model and the Con-
gressional intent behind the FHA.90 First, Congress extended 
84. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1254. The City's ordinance defined 
"family" to include groups of no more than four people unrelated by blood or mar-
riage. [d. (citing VA. BEACH CODE ZONING ORDINANCE § 111). 
85. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568-70; City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. 
Supp. at 1260. In City of Virginia Beach, Oxford House claimed that its residents 
would be exposed to "unwanted public scrutiny in the course of the required zon-
ing hearings." In fact, the court held that because Oxford House had not applied 
for and been denied a conditional use permit, its claim of discrimination was "un-
ripe." [d. 
86. See Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp 353, discussed supra at notes 73-74 
and City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, discussed supra at notes 71-72 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of discrimination by officials. 
87. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 362-363. There the court found that 
the Mayor's statement that "there is nothing more that I would like to do than to 
just come in and just tell these people you have until noon to get out of town" 
and his recommendation "to the municipal prosecutor that he should seek the 
most severe monetary penalty to establish an effective deterrent to this ongoing 
activity" amounted to discriminatory animus. [d. at 360. In Audubon the court 
awarded a permanent if\junction to prevent future interference with the Oxford 
House or other group living arrangements and $10,000.00 in civil penalties. [d. at 
362. 
88. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1568 n.8. 
89. [d. at 1567. 
90. The author notes that the Oxford House cases discussed supra in notes 67-
14
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the FHA's anti-discrimination protection to handicapped per-
sons in 1988.91 Second, Congress exempted local maximum 
occupancy restrictions.92 Therefore, the legislative history 
shows that Congress intended this provision to exempt only 
local restrictions that applied to all occupants.93 Nonetheless, 
many city ordinances limited occupancy of unrelated persons 
without restricting related persons.94 These ordinances have 
the effect of discriminating against handicapped persons.95 In 
addition, city officials continue to discriminate against handi-
capped persons in their application of the ordinances.96 Even 
in the face of this continued discrimination, several years 
passed before Oxford House's litigation reached the Supreme 
COurt.97 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the summer of 1990, Oxford House Inc. (hereinafter 
"Oxford House") opened a group home for ten to twelve recov-
ering drug and alcohol addicts in the City of Edmonds, Wash-
ington (hereinafter "the City").98 Although the residents were 
unrelated, the home opened in a neighborhood zoned for single 
family residences.99 Subsequently, the City issued criminal 
citations, charging that Oxford House1°O had violated the 
City's zoning code because the group home housed more than 
89 and accompanying text serve to illustrate actual discrimination handicapped 
persons faced in waging the battle against discriminatory ordinances and practices. 
91. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
Congress' extension of protection to handicapped persons. 
92. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
Congress's extension of the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions. 
93. See supra note 60 and accompanying text illustrating Congress' goal of 
uniform application of the exemption for local density ordinances. 
94. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text providing examples of city 
ordinances and discriminatory application of city ordinances. 
95. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for examples of ordinances 
that in their application discriminate against handicapped persons. 
96. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for examples of ordinances 
that in their application discriminate against handicapped persons. 
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for explanation of the time be-
tween Congress enacting the 1988 amendments and the Edrrwnds decision. 
98. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 
1779 (1995). 
99. [d. 
100. [d. The City issued criminal citations to a resident and the owner of the 
house. The owner of the house was later removed as a party. [d. 
15
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five unrelated individuals. 101 In response, Oxford House as-
serted that the group home needed to have eight to twelve 
residents to be financially and therapeutically viable. 102 Al-
though the City refused to allow the group home to remain in 
a single-family residential area, the City passed an ordinance 
permitting group homes in multifamily and general commer-
cial zones. 103 
The City then sued Oxford House in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington for a 
declaratory judgment.104 The City sought a declaration that 
the zoning ordinance qualified for exemption from the FHA as 
"reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions regarding the 
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing."105 
Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging 
that the City failed to make a "reasonable accommodation" 
when it prevented the group home from remaining in a single-
family residential zone. 106 Oxford House asserted that the 
City ordinance discriminated against handicapped persons in a 
manner prohibited by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 
1988.107 Oxford House claimed that under the Act, a refusal 
101. [d. (citing Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) § 21.30.010). 
The City's zoning code requires that the occupants of a single-family dwelling unit 
must comprise a "family." The code defined "family" as "an individual or two or 
more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or 
fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." Edmonds, 
115 S. Ct. at 1779. The City suspended prosecution for the criminal citations until 




105. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. 
Supp. 1995». 
106. [d. at 1779. 
107. [d. Congress originally enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin in housing. 
The FHA was later expanded to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex (1974), 
see id. at 1778 (citing Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 808(B), 
88 Stat 729), and the basis of handicap and familial status (1988), see id. (citing 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3602 (h), (k». The parties stipulated for this litigation that the resi-
dents of the group home were within the Act's definition of handicapped persons. 
[d. at 1779. Under the Act, "handicap means, with respect to a person 1) a physi-
calor mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's 
16
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to make a "reasonable accommodation" qualified as prohibited 
discrimination. lOS The United States filed a separate suit 
raising the same claim as Oxford House, and the two cases 
were consolidated. 109 
The District Court granted the City's summary judgment 
motion, finding that the ordinance qualified under the FHA's 
broad exemption for local ordinances that address maximum 
occupancy standards. no The District Court held that: (1) the 
exemption applied to the five unrelated person limitation in 
the ordinance; and (2) permitting the exemption was reason-
able as a matter oflaw.111 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the FHA's 
"absolute exemption inapplicable."u2 The Ninth Circuit re-
manded for further consideration of the claims raised by Ox-
ford House and the United States.113 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits were in conflict.114 Mer consideration, 
major life activities, 2) a record of having such an impairment, or 3) being regard-
ed as having such an impairment, but such terms do not include current, illegal 
use of or addiction to a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Cumm. Supp. 
1995). 
108. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Section 3604(f)(3)(B) states "For purposes of 
this subsection, discrimination includes . . . (B) a refusal to make reasonable ac-
commodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations 
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 
dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
109. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. 
110. Id. The District Court held that the City's ordinance "defining 'family' is 
exempt . . . as a 'reasonable . . . restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of 
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.'" Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. The Ninth Circuit focused on the legislative intent behind the FHA 
protections for handicapped persons. Specifically, the court noted "Congress intend-
ed the FHAA [the 1988 amendments] to protect the right of handicapped persons 
to live in the residence of their choice in the community. [citation ommitted] The 
FHAA was to 'end the unnecessary exclusion of person with handicaps from the 
American mainstream.'" City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council 18 
F.3d 802, at 806 (9th Cir. 1994). 
113. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. Specifically, Oxford House claimed the City 
refusal's to make "a reasonable accommodation" constituted a violation of the FHA. 
Id. 
114. Id. at 1780; Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992). In 
Elliott the city ordinance restricted to four the number of unrelated persons who 
17
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the Supreme Court held that the City's ordinance did not qual-
ify for exemption from the FHA.115 However, the Court re-
manded to the Ninth Circuit to consider Oxford House's coun-
terclaim that the City had wrongfully discriminated under the 
FHA by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation. 116 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S MAJORITY OPINION l17 
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion began by differentiat-
ing land use restrictions118 from maximum occupancy restric-
tions. 119 According to Justice Ginsburg, land use restrictions 
are enacted to locate sites having compatible uses close togeth-
er within districts,120 and maximum occupancy restrictions 
are enacted to protect public health and safety by limiting 
overcrowding. 121 Since the FHA exempts local restrictions re-
garding maximum occupancy of a dwelling, the majority noted 
that a city's zoning ordinance mayor may not qualify for ex-
emption.122 The Court closely examined the legislative history 
of the FHA 1988 Amendments which created the exemption for 
local maximum occupancy restrictions. 123 The Court found 
that Congress intended to protect maximum occupancy restric-
tions not tied to family composition rules and not devised to 
protect the character of a neighborhood by focusing on house-
hold composition. 124 
could live together in a single family residential unit. [d. 
115. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783. 
116. [d. 
117. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and 
Breyer joined in the majority opinion. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _ 
U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1778 (1995). 
118. [d. at 1780. "Land use restrictions designate 'districts in which only com-
patible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.' [citation] These re-
strictions typically categorize uses as single-family residential, multiple-family resi-
dential, commercial, or industrial." [d. at 1781. 
119. [d. at 1781. "Maximum occupancy restrictions ... cap the number of occu-
pants per dwelling, typically in relation to available floor space or the number and 
type of rooms. [citation] These restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all resi-
dents of all dwelling units. [d. (emphasis in original). 
120. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780-81. 
121. [d. at 1782. 
122. 42 U.S.C. 3607(b)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780. 
123. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82. 
124. [d. See especially id. at 1782 n.8. 
18
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In its analysis, the Court first noted that Congress cast 
section 3607(b)(1)125 of the FHA within the already evolving 
distinction between land use restrictions and maximum occu-
pancy restrictions.126 Land use restrictions typically divide a 
city into districts in which compatible uses of land are permit-
ted and incompatible uses of land are prohibited. 127 The 
Court recognized that cities have further restricted land use 
within residential districts to single-family and multiple-family 
use. The Court found that when drawing these further restric-
tions, a city must necessarily define the term "family.,,128 By 
reserving land for single-family residences, the Court noted 
that cities seek to secure "zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make 
the area a sanctuary for people.»129 
On the other hand, the Court reasoned that maximum 
occupancy restrictions seek to limit the number of occupants 
per dwelling in relation to the available floor space and the 
number and type of rooms. 130 The Court stressed that these 
restrictions typically apply to "all residents of all dwellings" in 
the designated area. 131 Finally, the Court recognized that 
maximum occupancy restrictions are enacted to protect health 
and safety by preventing overcrowding.132 
Mter clarifying the distinction between land use restric-
tions and maximum occupancy restrictions, the majority 
125. The provision which exempts reasonable local restrictions from the FHA. 
126. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780. 
127. [d. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the 
fIrst case in which the Court upheld land use restrictions as constitutional. Al-
though the land use restrictions were challenged as "takings" under the 5th 
Amendment, the case still stands for the proposition that a city may restrict land 
use by district which is known as "Euclidean zoning." [d. The Court noted that 
generally a city will separate competing land uses to prevent problems often char-
acterized as the "pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1781 (citing Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 388). 
128. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781 As the Court said in Edmonds, "[t]o limit 
land use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term 'family,' 
thus family composition rules are an essential component of single-family residen-
tial use restrictions." [d. 
129. [d. (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)). 
130. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 178l. 
131. [d. (emphasis in original). 
132. [d. 
19
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turned to the language of the exemption provision. 133 The 
Court found that the language encompassed maximum occu-
pancy restrictions but did not cover family composition rules 
that are typically tied to land use restrictions. l34 The majority 
reasoned that rules that "plainly and unmistakably" cap the 
total number of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding 
qualify under the FHA's broad exemption. However, the Court 
stated that rules focusing on household composition rather 
than on total number of occupants are not exempt from the 
FHA. 136 
The Court reasoned that the provisions of the City's ordi-
nance at issue were classic examples of a use restriction cou-
pled with a family composition rule. The main provision in-
voked against Oxford House limited use to single-family resi-
dences. 136 Furthermore, a second provision in the ordinance 
limited the number of occupants to a dwelling based on floor 
area. 137 The City argued that the third provision, the family 
composition rule, qualified for the FHA exemption as a maxi-
mum occupancy restriction because it limited the number of 
unrelated persons who may live in a single-family dwelling to 
five. 13s The majority rejected the City's argument because the 
family composition rule did not answer the question "[w]hat is 
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a 
house?,,139 
133. [d. "[R]estrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted 
to occupy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
134. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82. "In sum, rules that cap the total number 
of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling 'plainly and unmistak-
ably,' [citation omitted] fall within § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption from the 
FHA's governance; rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighbor-
hood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number 
of occupants living quarters can contain, do not." [d. at 1782. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. (citing ECOC § 16.20.010 which provides that the sole "Permitted Pri-
mary Us[e]" in a single-family residential zone is "[s]ingle-family dwelling units.") 
[d. 
137. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (citing ECOC § 19.10.000, adopting the Uni-
form Housing Code § 503(b) (1988)). Here the provision provided that each unit 
have one room with a minimum of 120 square feet floor area. Other rooms must 
have a minimum of 70 square feet. In addition where two or more people occupy 
a room, the floor area shall be increased at the rate of 50 square feet for each 
occupant in excess of two. [d. 
138. [d. (citing ECOC § 21.30.010) (emphasis added). 
139. [d. 
20
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In conclusion, the Court held that the ordinance was not 
exempt under the FHA because it restricted the total number 
of unrelated occupants without also restricting the number of 
related occupants to occupy a house. l40 However, the Court 
held only that the City's provision did not qualify for the FHA 
exemption, merely affirming the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the 
case.141 On remand, the Court instructed the District Court to 
determine whether the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions, 
requiring a "reasonable accommodation," applied and what the 
City should have done to "accommodate" the Oxford House 
under the FHA.142 
B. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Thomas' dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy, contained two main points. l43 First, Thomas ana-
lyzed the "plain language" of the FHA exemption provision to 
find that the ordinance qualified for exemption. l44 Second, 
Thomas criticized the majority for reading the statute too. nar-
rowly.l45 
Using "plain language," Thomas focused on the exemption 
provision's use of the words "any," "restrict," and "regard. " 146 
The exemption does not contain qualifying language requiring 
"absolute" or "unqualified" maximum occupancy restrictions as 
found by the maj ority. 147 Thomas emphasized Congress' 
choice of broad terms in signalling exempt categories and re-
strictions. l48 From this, Thomas reasoned that the ordinance 
was eligible for exemption because it was a "restriction" ad-
dressing occupancy density.149 
140. [d. at 1782·83. 
141. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. at 1783·88. 
144. [d. at 1783·85. 
145. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785·88. 
146. [d. at 1783·85. 
147. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. "[Tlhe rule that 'no house... shall have more than five 
occupants' ... readily qualifies as a 'restrictio[nl regarding the maximum number 
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.' " [d. 
21
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Thomas further used his "plain language" approach to 
criticize the majority for framing the issue around the number 
of occupants permitted to occupy a house. 15o Thomas felt that 
the ordinance need not establish an absolute maximum num-
ber of occupants because the exemption applied to restrictions 
"regarding" maximum occupancy. 151 By analyzing the lan-
guage/52 Justice Thomas found that the ordinance qualified 
for exemption from the FHA.153 
Secondly, Thomas argued that the majority read the stat-
ute too narrowlyl54 and negated the FHA's broad policy. 155 
Thomas reasoned that Congress sought to effectuate the policy 
of fair housing by the language it used in the statute.156 Nar-
rowly reading that language, he argued, frustrated the purpose 
of the statute.157 In addition, Thomas asserted that land use 
regulation was an area left to the states to the exclusion of 
Congress. l58 Therefore, under the United States' federalist 
structure of government, if Congress regulates that area, its 
intention to preempt the states should be clearly stated. 159 
150. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784 (criticizing the majority for posing the wrong 
question in relation to the statute, citing the majority opinion at 1782). 
151. [d. "To take advantage of the exemption, a local, state, or federal law need 
not impose a restriction establishing an absolute maximum number of occupants; 
under § 3607(b)(1), it is necessary only that such law impose a restriction "regard-
ing" the maximum number of occupants." [d. (emphasis in original, citing the 
majority opinion at 1782). (Emphasis added to text.) 
152. Thomas mentioned synonyms of "regard," specifically "concern," "relate to," 
or "bear on" to make his point that to be exempted, the ordinance did not have to 
establish an absolute maximum number of occupants. [d. 
153. [d. at 1785. Thomas stated the Ninth Circuit's decision should be reversed. 
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. The stated policy is "to provide for fair housing throughout the United 
States." [d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601). 
156. [d. 
157. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 
522 (1987)). 
158. [d. at 1786. Thomas argued that the majority's opinion ignored precedent 
where the Court held the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to 
state judges because Congress had not intended it be applied to state employees. 
[d. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) where the Court held that the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not protect state court judges although 
the Act "broadly prohibits" age discrimination). Thomas' reasoning rested on the 
federalist structure of our government which requires Congress to clearly indicate 
it is preempting state power in areas that are traditionally left to the states to 
regulate. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct at 1785-86. 
159. [d. The court in Edmonds stated: 
22
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While reading the statute narrowly may be appropriate in 
other areas, construing the exemption narrowly in the area of 
land use was unreasonable. 160 
As part of his criticism of the majority's narrow reading, 
Thomas discussed the majority's use of the two terms, "maxi-
mum occupancy restrictions" and "family composition 
rules.,,161 Thomas dismissed the categories as fictions. 162 He 
found that "maximum occupancy restrictions" failed to encom-
pass all the types of restrictions exempted from the FHA.163 
As an example, he argued that the plain language of the stat-
ute does not mention available floor space or the number and 
type of rooms. l64 Thomas reasoned that the language of the 
statute does not require the restrictions to apply to all resi-
dents of all dwelling unitS. 165 In addition, the statute does 
not require restrictions to protect health and safety by prevent-
ing overcrowding. 166 Although Thomas conceded that the stat-
utory language encompasses "maximum occupancy restric-
tions," the statutory language does not necessarily exclude the 
City's ordinance as claimed by the majority.167 Thomas found 
that the majority's distinction between pure maximum occu-
pancy and land use restrictions was irrelevant to the issue 
presented by the City's ordinance.16s 
[T]he power of Congress to 'legislate in areas traditionally 
regulated by the States' is 'an extraordinary power in a 
federalist system,' and 'a power that we must assume 
Congress does not exercise lightly.' [citation omitted] 
Thus, we require that 'Congress should make its intention 
'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the . . . 
States.' 
Id. at 1786 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). 
160. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1786. Thomas focused on the concept of federalism 
which is at the core of our government. Id. 
16l. Id. at 1786-88. 
162. Id. at 1786 ("zoning rules simply invented by the majority.") 
163. Id. at 1787 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)). 
164. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1787. 
165. Id. (emphasis in original). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. "In other words, although the majority's discussion will no doubt pro-
vide guidance in future cases, it is completely irrelevant to the question presented 
in this case." Edmonds, 115. S. Ct. at 1787. 
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In a similar argument, Justice Thomas criticized the 
majority's use of "family composition rules" as an invented 
category of zoning restrictions. 169 Thomas found that the ma-
jority opinion "hinged" on its classification of the City's ordi-
nance as a "family composition rule." This criticism rested on 
the fact that the majority opinion said "virtually nothing about 
this crucial category."170 Concluding, Thomas returned to the 
"plain language" of the statute to support his position that the 
FHA's exemption for local restrictions encompasses "any" zon-
ing restriction as long as it "regards the maximum number of 
occupants.,,17l Thomas noted that the statute does not contain 
qualifying language as to the purpose of the exemption. 172 
Again, Thomas found that the language of the exemption does 
not require "absolute" maximum occupancy restrictions. 173 
These two grounds supported the dissent's finding that the 
majority misinterpreted the language of the statute.174 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Edmonds decision is important for several rea-
sons. 175 First, the decision takes a step towards curbing invid-
ious discrimination and helping handicapped persons to attain 
greater access to housing. 176 Second, the decision is important 
because it will affect how future state and local zoning ordi-
nances are written,177 discouraging strict application of cur-
rent ordinances that would adversely impact the rights of 
handicapped persons. 178 
169. [d. 
170. [d. at 1782 (citing the majority opinion at 1782). 
171. [d. at 1788. 
172. [d. "Section 3607(b)(1) [the exemption provision] limits neither the permis-
sible purposes of a qualifying zoning restriction nor the ways in which such a 
restriction may accomplish its purposes." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1788. 
173. See supra notes 146-158 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
the plain language approach. 
174. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1788. 
175. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776 
(1995); see infra notes 177-196 and accompanying test for further discussion of the 
impact of the decision. 
176. See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
the impact on access to housing. 
177. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 n.3 (setting forth the State of Washington's 
1993 law prohibiting local city ordinances that discriminate between handicapped 
persons and other persons, which was enacted after this litigation began). 
178. See Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program 
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The Edmonds decision, however, does not discuss two 
important issues. First, the Court did not address the "reason-
able accommodations" counter-claim raised by Oxford 
House. 179 Second, the Court neglected to indicate the extent 
.of the impact that the majority's "narrow reading" approach 
would have on future FHA litigation. ISO 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EDMONDS DECISION 
First, the Edmonds decision is important because it signif-
icantly helps handicapped persons to attain greater access to 
housing. Oxford House residents benefit because cities will no 
longer be able to regulate group living situations by defining 
what constitutes a "family" or by limiting occupancy in another 
prohibited way. lSI Thus, Oxford House residents will have 
greater access to housing because occupancy limits, in the form 
of now-illegal ordinances, will be removed. ls2 Similarly, other 
persons recognized as "handicapped" under the FHA definition 
will also achieve greater access to housing. ls3 
Exempted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, September 7, 1995, at C3 (lawsuit on 
behalf of Oxford Houses challenging the District of Columbia's characterization of 
the group homes as "rooming houses," yet allowing the homes to operate during 
the pending litigation; settlement negotiations began shortly after the Court's deci-
sion in Edmonds). 
179. Edmonds 115 S. Ct. at 1783. The Court did not address the "reasonable 
accommodations" claim because the parties did not litigate it in the lower court. 
Id. (stating the Court only addressed the threshold question of whether the City's 
ordinance qualified for exemption and that the lower court must now decide 
whether the City's actions constituted a "failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tions" as provided in the anti-discrimination provision of the FHA). 
180. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (the majority found this case was an instance 
where the exception to a general policy is read narrowly to preserve the primary 
operation of the policy). Author's note: See the case generally because the majority 
never indicated when the "narrow reading" approach would be used in the future. 
Id. 
181. Id. 
182. James G. Sotos, In Narrow Ruling, Court Rejects Limit on Group Home, 
CHICAGO DAlLY L. BULL., May 18, 1995, at 6 (summarizing the Edmonds decision 
as concluding the city could not rely on its zoning restriction to regulate the Ox-
ford House). 
183. United States v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (holding the City violated the FHA when it characterized a home for elderly 
handicapped persons as "multiple family," it discriminated against the residents); 
c.r. Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992) (after 
Edmonds, the City in Elliott would likely be unable to successfully argue their 
ordinance was exempt; therefore the residents of the home, which was not mod-
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In addition to expanding access to housing for handicapped 
persons, the Edmonds decision will curb invidious discrimina-
tion. l84 In the past, this discrimination has surfaced as ste-
reotypical attitudes based on fear and ignorance, manifesting 
as concern over lowered property values lS5 and unequal appli-
cation of zoning laws. ls6 However, the majority's utilization of 
legislative history/s7 including a thorough discussion of the 
specific discrimination Congress sought to prohibit, suggests 
that invidious discrimination will now be less tolerated. 188 
Second, the Edmonds decision is important because it will 
affect how future state and local ordinances are written. 189 In 
Edmonds, the Court found that ordinances should be written 
to impose restrictions based on density/90 such as persons-
per-bedroom or persons-per-square-foot and should not be 
based on family-compositioin rules. 191 Therefore, an 
eled as an Oxford House group home, would now be protected). 
184. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for examples of invidious 
discrimination. See also Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (stating that rules that fas-
ten on family composition instead of total number of occupants do not qualify for 
exemption from the FHA). 
185. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. See also City of Taylor, 872 
F. Supp. at 433 (criticizing the City's strict application of its zoning ordinance to a 
home for elderly handicapped persons on the basis that the "for-profit" home did 
not fall under the definition of "family;" the City discriminated against the home 
because it is the only one the "for-profit" status has been used against); and 
Adriana Colindres, City Desk News, PEORIA J. STAR, September 11, 1993, at A6 
(discussing a proposed change to the City of East Peoria's zoning code that would 
require group homes for people with disabilities be built at least 660 to 1500 feet 
apart). 
187. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82 nn.8-9, (citing House Report, supra note 7, 
at 31). 
188. House Report, supra note 7, at 24 (examples of this discrimination include 
imposing local ordinances on congregate living arrangements of unrelated persons 
with disabilities or enforcing otherwise neutral rules in a way that discriminates 
against handicapped persons). 
189. See supra note 177 and accompanying text addressing the impact on con-
struction of future ordinances. See Jim Gogek, A Bad Way to Tackle our Social· 
Problems, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., November 24, 1995, at B7 (criticizing the 
City Council's decision to discriminate against the mentally ill and recovering drug 
addicts by the Council retaining power to keep group homes out of neighborhoods 
that do not want them, in direct violation of the FHA). 
190. House Report, supra note 7, at 31 (stating reasonable limits on the number 
of occupants based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit would be 
allowed to continue as long as they were applied equally). 
191. See also Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782 n.B (quoting the House Report, supra 
note 7, approving limits based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit 
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ordinance will no longer be neutral if it discriminates against 
handicapped persons living in group homes.192 Furthermore, 
Edmonds aids handicapped persons because it discourages 
strict application of current ordinances,193 by finding that the 
exemption provision was intended to allow for restrictions that 
apply to all occupants and limit occupancy on the basis of per-
son per square foot. 194 
B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Although handicapped persons will benefit in terms of 
greater access and curtailed discrimination, the opinion failed 
to adequately analyze Oxford House's "reasonable accommoda-
tions" claim raised by Oxford House.195 The "reasonable ac-
commodations" claim was not reached because the parties only 
presented the threshold "exemption" question and did not liti-
gate the "reasonable accommodations" claim in the lower 
court. 196 
The FHA provides that discrimination includes "a refusal 
to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practic-
es, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary 
or the sleeping areas of the unit). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for 
further definition of density restrictions. 
192. The author fears, however, that the density limits could be placed so low 
as to have the effect of discriminating against group homes that may have higher 
density living arrangements in terms of persons-per-bedroom. 
193. See Paul Duggan, Group-Home Operator, District Settle Lawsuit; Program 
Exempted from Zoning Rules, WASH. POST, September 7, 1995, at C3 (lawsuit on 
behalf of Oxford Houses challenging the District of Columbia's characterization of 
the group homes as "rooming houses," yet allowing the homes to operate during 
the pending litigation; settlement negotiations began shortly after the Court's deci-
sion in Edmonds). 
194. Edmonds 115 S. Ct. at 1782 (rules that fasten on the composition of 
households rather than the total number of occupants a residence can contain do 
not qualify for exemption from the FHA). 
195. [d. at 1783 (stating the decision only addressed the threshold question of 
whether the ordinance was exempt from the FHA; on remand, the lower court 
must decide whether the City's actions violated the FHA prohibitions against dis-
crimination). 
196. [d. See also City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bld'g Code Council, 18 F.3d 
802, 803-04, (9th Cir. 1994) (the 9th Circuit's decision in Edmonds) (stating that 
after granting the City's summary judgment motion, compliance with the substan-
tive requirements of the FHA is not at issue because the district court did not 
reach that question). 
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to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 
dwelling."197 Because a court's interpretation of "reasonable 
accommodations" necessarily involves a fact-intensive sur-
vey /98 the Supreme Court remanded to the lower courts for 
consideration of whether an accommodation would be appropri-
ate. 199 
In addition to leaving the "reasonable accommodations" 
issue unresolved, the majority did not indicate just how far 
their "narrow reading" of FHA exemptions would extend.2°O 
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg's word choice creates ambiguity 
as to whether the Court will utilize the approach in the fu-
ture.201 Ginsburg stated that "this case [was] an instance" 
where an exemption to the FHA's general anti-discrimination 
policy "is sensibly read 'narrowly'" to promote the goals of the 
FHA. 202 
This language suggests two meanings with very different 
impacts on potential FHA litigation. On the one hand, the 
Court could be holding that the factual scenario implicated by 
this Oxford House presents an isolated instance worthy of 
reading an exemption from the FHA narrowly.2oa On the oth-
er hand, the Court could be announcing a new general stan-
dard, mandating in all instances a narrow reading of exemp-
tions to the general anti-discrimination policy of the FHA.204 
Ginsburg's use of the words "instance" and "sensibly" make it 
unclear whether the Court will use this "narrow reading" ap-
proach in the next case challenging a discriminatory ordinance 
or practice. Therefore, the impact of the Edmonds decision on 
197. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(3)(B) (Cumm. Supp. 1995). 
198. City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bld'g Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 807 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (the 9th Circuit's decision in Edmonds). "Many factors must be weighed 
to determine whether reasonable accommodation under [the FHA] was achieved." 
[d. 
199. Edmonds at 1783, affirming the Ninth Circuit's remand "for further consid-
eration of the claims asserted by Oxford House and the United States." [d. 
200. [d. at 1780, 1782. 
201. See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice 
Ginsburg's choice of language and the impact of the decision on future litigation. 
202. [d. at 1780. 
203. [d. at 1780. 
204. [d. 
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future FHA litigation remains unknown in the absence of a 
clear message from the Court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., the United 
States Supreme Court held that the City's ordinance did not 
qualify for the Fair Housing Act's exemption for local maxi-
mum occupancy restrictions.205 The Edmonds decision marks 
the first time that the Court has invalidated an ordinance 
because it did not meet the requirements for the exemption 
provision.206 Consequently, the Edmonds decision marks an 
important turning point for handicapped persons in achieving 
greater access to housing. However, because the Court did not 
address the "reasonable accommodations" claim raised by Ox-
ford House, the impact of Edmonds upon future FHA litigation 
ultimately remains unclear since the majority failed to clearly 
announce whether its "narrow reading" approach would apply 
in subsequent cases. 
Michelle R.K. Todus207 
205. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House Inc., _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 
1783 (1995). 
206. [d. at 1780-83. 
207. Golden Gate University, School of Law, Class of 1997. Thank you Mark, 
Wendy, Rob and Professor Andersson for your time and patience with me while I 
was writing this article. 
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